Volume 2: The Path to Prominence Chapter 53: Corporate Restructuring (Part V)
After two weeks of intense work, and with the coordination of my father-in-law, Shu Zhongquan, through reporting and communicating with the Assessment and Distribution Division and the supervising director, clear parameters were established regarding net profit targets, incentive bonus sharing ratios, and the proportion of equity to be purchased with cash. We were now just waiting for the asset valuation to finalize the equity purchase price. These details had also been thoroughly reported and communicated to Director Shi, resulting in a plan approved with his nod.
Over the next two weeks of intensive labor, regarding the scope of employee shareholding, everyone reached a consensus that full employee stock ownership was not feasible. The initially determined scope of personnel and equity share proportions were structured strictly according to hierarchical levels. The eligible personnel ranged from workshop directors and deputy section chiefs upwards. Plant leaders at the principal level held 2%, deputy level 1%, and the percentages decreased progressively, down to 0.2% and 0.3% for deputy section chiefs and section chiefs, respectively. At first glance, this scheme seemed to consist entirely of cadres holding shares, with ordinary workers excluded.
After a final report to Director Shi, and thanks to my active advocacy, we successfully expanded the shareholding scope to include workers with senior professional titles, provincial-level or higher technical experts, model workers, and those with a bachelor's degree or higher. In determining shareholding proportions, these factors were factored in alongside official rank. This was all I could possibly do for the workers.
Following the completion of asset verification, financial auditing, and asset valuation, the entire plan was finalized. Evaluated by the Huajiang Tongzheng Asset Evaluation Firm and filed for record with the Huajiang Provincial State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC), the total net asset value of the Huajiang Dongfang Chemical Plant was appraised at 364 million yuan. Post-restructuring, the Huajiang Provincial SASAC would hold 80% of the shares calculated based on these net assets, while the management team and key backbone employees would increase their capital through bonuses and personal investments to hold 20%, establishing a partnership enterprise as the shareholding platform. Dongfang Chemical would first be comprehensively restructured into a wholly state-owned company, and three years later, based on the audited realization of agreed net profit targets, management and key employee shareholding would be implemented through a capital increase and share expansion.
Regarding the net profit targets, building upon the audited 2010 net profit of 56.3 million yuan, the net profits for 2011 through 2013 were required to reach 60 million yuan, 65 million yuan, and 70 million yuan respectively. Any audited portion exceeding the net profit targets by 30% would be awarded to the aforementioned shareholding entities, while any shortfall would be funded independently by the management and employees. Employees included in the shareholding scope could voluntarily choose whether to participate in the capital increase after three years; those who chose not to participate would forfeit their rights to the bonus portions. All remaining rights would belong collectively to those who opted to participate in the capital increase. For employees included in this shareholding scope, a separate incentive plan would be formulated in conjunction with this bonus and the plant's existing systems.
Certain restrictive conditions were placed on the shares held by management and backbone employees resulting from the implementation of this plan: they could not be transferred within three years, nor could they be transferred externally. In the event of resignation, illegal or criminal acts, or termination, the shares had to be compulsorily transferred at the original purchase price. For those who left the company normally due to job transfers or retirement, the shares had to be transferred at a price corresponding to the proportional value of the net assets of the previous year. The transferred shares would be given priority for acquisition by newly eligible management and employees according to prescribed shareholding ratios.
At this point, the restructuring plan had essentially taken shape. Because the final determination of the corporate governance structure for the post-restructuring entity only defined the number of seats for the board of directors, board of supervisors, management team, and party committee without designating specific candidates, it was basically settled that the board of directors would consist of five members, including one chairman; the board of supervisors would comprise three members, including one convener; and the party committee would have five members, including one secretary and one deputy secretary.
What came as rather a surprise was the configuration of the management team. The four members—one general manager, one executive deputy general manager, and one chief financial officer—seemed quite normal, corresponding directly to the original positions of executive deputy plant director and chief accountant. However, the creation of an additional deputy general manager for operations left me completely baffled. Previously, there had been two deputy plant directors respectively in charge of production, procurement, and sales, positions held by Song Dagang and Ruan Changqing. Now, with only one such position available, only one of the two could ascend. Initially, I had not paid much attention to this, but pondering it carefully now, a sudden chill ran through my spine: could Ruan Changqing truly be slated for the general manager position? My father-in-law, Shu Zhongquan, had already analyzed this scenario with me, pointing out that it would be extremely disadvantageous to me. Naturally, I paid close attention to this development.
That night, I hurriedly called my father-in-law, Shu Zhongquan, to inquire. To my dismay, he said he knew nothing about it because the Reform Division was not responsible for candidate selection, and given everyone's awareness of our familial relationship, it was even more inconvenient for him to pry.
Since my father-in-law Shu Zhongquan had no way of knowing, I could think of no other alternatives. On this matter, it was impossible for me to question Director Shi; if he wished to tell me, he would naturally do so. By now, the shareholding plan, the corporate governance structure, the secured preferential policies, and the new articles of association were all complete. The entire plan was ready, and at Director Shi's single command, it could be submitted. No matter how many doubts lingered in my heart, I had no choice but to let the matter rest.